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Abstract 
This article seeks to rekindle a version of  the age-old view that aesthetic education can contribute to 
the development of  virtue. It proceeds as follows. First, it introduces the moral beauty view, 
whereby the moral virtues are beautiful, and the moral vices ugly, character traits. Second, two ways 
in which moral beauty and ugliness can manifest themselves are considered: in people and in 
artworks. Third, it is argued that character education couched partly in aesthetic terms, and coupled 
with the cultivation of  a sensitivity to moral beauty and ugliness, promise a solid and motivationally 
robust anchor for moral character development. It is suggested that introducing the notions of  
moral beauty and ugliness in our conceptual repertoire, coupled with the presence of  moral beauty 
in our surroundings, can undergird more traditional pathways to virtue, whilst being congenial to the 
maintenance of  virtue. Before closing, three objections against these suggestions are addressed, and 
some avenues for exploring the notion of  moral beauty vis-à-vis moral motivation and education are 
proposed. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper, I consider how the notions of  moral beauty and ugliness, in the form of  what I call the 
‘moral beauty view’, can play a key role in character or moral education, and how the presence of  moral 
beauty can be a powerful source of  moral inspiration and motivation for suitably brought up people. 
My central aim is to make fellow researchers, and especially those with an empirical and practical 
outlook, aware of  the notion of  moral beauty, to invite them to reflect on certain possibilities that 
come from thinking about it, and, more ambitiously, to inspire their curiosity concerning certain 
hypotheses about the importance of  moral beauty and ugliness for moral motivation and education. In 
doing so, some of  the discussion that follows is speculative, but the type of  speculation I will engage in 
is, I hope, welcome, on two counts. On the one hand, it has an eminent intellectual precedent, both in 
being grounded in a long tradition, and in having been endorsed and advocated by great, but very 
different, thinkers, from Aristotle and Plotinus to Hume and Smith. On the other hand, my reflections 
here are not ethereal, but are, at least in principle, empirically testable, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. 
 I will proceed as follows. First, I will introduce what I call the moral beauty view, which states 
that the moral virtues are beautiful, and the moral vices ugly, character traits. Second, I will consider 
two ways in which moral beauty and ugliness can manifest themselves in our surroundings, namely, in 
artworks—including painting, architecture, installations, memorials, music; and in people––including 
our acquaintances but presumably also those who maintain a public profile, including intellectuals, 
politicians, artists, and celebrities. Third, I will offer some thoughts on how character education 
couched partly in aesthetic terms, and the cultivation of  a sensitivity to beauty and ugliness in moral 
characters and actions, wherever those may be found or manifested, promises a motivationally robust 
anchor for the cultivation of  moral character. Before closing, I will address some preliminary worries 
one might raise against my suggestions, and propose some ways in which my hypotheses might be 
tested or put to practical use. 
II. Introducing the Moral Beauty View 
The notion of  moral beauty and ugliness as I understand it here is traceable to the British philosophers 
of  the Enlightenment, particularly the Third Earl of  Shaftesbury (2001), Francis Hutcheson (2004), 
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and David Hume (1975). However, the view that beauty and morality are connected in important ways 
is arguably also part and parcel of  the Greek virtue-ethical tradition, insofar as both Plato and Aristotle 
thought that virtue is ‘kalon’, a term used to refer to what is at once beautiful and good, and indeed 
Aristotle frequently suggests that the virtuous person’s actions are ‘kalon’ and performed for the sake of  
the ‘kalon’ (2002, pp. 133, 142). In fact, I think that what I call the moral beauty view, or something very 
similar to it, is a staple of  Aristotelian virtue ethics, but will not further pursue this claim, because doing 
so would raise interpretative issues that I cannot resolve here.  Such views can also be found in a variety 1
of  other philosophical and religious traditions, including early and medieval Christian ethics, for 
instance in Hugh of  St Victor who wrote that ‘[w]e long to be perfectly carved and sculpted in the 
image of  good men, and when excellent and sublime qualities … shine forth in them like the beauty in 
exquisite statues, … we strive to recreate these qualities in ourselves’ (quoted in Jaeger, 2012, p. 137), as 
well as in Aquinas.   2
 Whatever it is that the foregoing philosophers and theologians thought, I suspect that 
Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith, could not have simply been speaking loosely, or been terminologically 
confused when they said things like the ‘Author of  Nature … has made Virtue a lovely Form’, such that 
there is ‘a Beauty in Characters, in Manners’ (Hutcheson, 2004, p. 9); or that taste arbitrates matters 
both moral and aesthetic, and that there is a ‘moral beauty’, which, he thought, ‘closely resembles’ 
natural beauty (Hume, 1975, p. 291); or again that ‘benevolence bestows upon those actions which 
proceed from it, a beauty superior to all others, [while] the want of  it, and much more the contrary 
inclination, communicates a peculiar deformity to whatever evidences such a disposition’ (Smith, 2002, 
p. 297). It is partly to avoid questions about translation and interpretation that I develop my own view 
of  moral beauty from this more modern tradition.  3
 Specifically, the view that I espouse—and that I take to be implicit in statements such as the 
foregoing, as well as others like them—holds that the moral virtues are beautiful and the moral vices 
ugly. More precisely, my view is that if  a trait is a moral virtue, then it is a beautiful character trait; and, 
conversely, if  a trait is a moral vice, then it is an ugly character trait.  This is a conceptual claim, which states that 4
beauty and ugliness are necessary conditions for moral virtue and moral vice, respectively. Of  course, 
my main aim here is to suggest that while the claim is conceptual, it may have far-reaching implications 
for domains such as moral education and motivation. Now, as stated, the view implies a number of  
things. First, that the character traits in question are themselves beautiful and ugly, respectively. Second, 
that characters (and people) are beautiful and ugly, insofar as they possess or manifest such traits.  5
Third, we speak of  the beauty of  someone’s honesty, or of  someone being disgusting for being 
dishonest, rotten for being untrustworthy, or wonderful for being kind. I think that the same applies to 
actions, but it is important to note that actions are intuitively beautiful or ugly insofar as they manifest 
the relevant traits, or at least the motivation or intentions that are (partly) constitutive of  such traits. 
Fourth, that artefacts which manifest such traits, notably artworks, are also beautiful and ugly insofar as 
they do so. Although I will largely assume the claim that artworks can manifest character traits, I should 
say a few words by way of  explanation. Works can manifest moral character traits in virtue of  being 
artefacts in which choices of  a manifested artist can be traced. The manifested artist is the artist as she 
or he manifests her or himself  in the work; thus her or his qualities are ipso facto qualities of  the work.  6
Thus, it is not simply by representing characters that manifest certain attitudes that artworks and other 
artefacts can manifest character traits. After all, villains in many a Shakespeare tragedy are highly 
immoral but Shakespeare’s tragedies hardly manifest moral vices; quite the contrary. Instead, it is in 
virtue of  ethically-evaluable attitudes that works of  art can manifest––for instance, cruelty in many 
works by the Marquis de Sade; forgiveness and pity for Anna Karenina by Tolstoy’s eponymous 
novel––that they can be said to manifest moral character traits. 
 A word is perhaps also in order on how I understand the notion of  beauty. It is well known that 
there is hardly consensus on what beauty is and that many philosophers in the analytic tradition had, at 
least until recently, given up on developing accounts of  beauty. However, there is at least one claim 
about beauty that is not very controversial, namely that beauty is a response-dependent property, at 
least partly identifiable by the distinctive kind of  pleasure it evokes in suitably competent appreciators, 
under specified conditions, which may themselves differ depending on the kind of  object to be 
appreciated. This is common ground amongst thinkers as diverse as Alexander Nehamas (2007, pp. 
71ff.), Roger Scruton (2009, p. 5), Mary Mothersill (1984, pp. 271-275), Dave Hickey (2012, pp. 2-3, 
69-71), Crispin Sartwell (2006), and Berys Gaut (2007, pp. 118-119), to name a few recent contributors 
on the topic of  beauty. Of  course, this is not all there is to the notion of  beauty. Additionally, for 
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instance, beauty is also plausibly thought to be connected to an object’s form and involves pleasure in 
the contemplation of  such form (while ugliness plausibly involves displeasure in deformity, as I have 
argued in my 2017). However, given the lack of  consensus on what beauty is, philosophers who wish to 
establish whether something or other is beautiful often appeal to ordinary intuitions and experience, or 
engage in thought experiments. I will therefore follow suit below, though it is worth adding that, 
fortunately, it is not my aim to defend the moral beauty view here, not least because I have done so 
elsewhere, both by showing that moral beauty is compatible with formalist considerations about beauty 
(2018b), and by appealing to empirical evidence to support the view (2018a).  Instead, as already 7
indicated, my focus here will be narrower.  
 I have thus far given an outline of  my view, along with some clarifications. But it is worth 
briefly pointing out some of  the view’s theoretical merits and implications of  the moral beauty view, 
partly in order to suggest what makes it worth a philosopher’s while, and partly to show how it forges a 
link between aesthetics and ethics in both theory and practice. First of  all, the moral beauty view 
integrates aesthetics and ethics. For if, as it implies, central full-blown judgements of  moral value are at 
least partly aesthetic, then there must be a deeper connection than mere mutual influence or 
dependence. Given the view, Gaut observes, contra certain extreme formalists, or the Romantics who 
sought to sever artistic or aesthetic from moral value, it turns out to be ‘contradictory to hold that 
beauty matters in art, but that morality does not’ (2007, p. 132). For, as McGinn notes, one upshot is 
that ‘[t]he true aesthete must be a moralist, since he cares about the beauty of  his soul’ (1997, p. 138). 
Likewise, this view serves as a wake-up call to the moralist counterparts of  aestheticists, viz., those 
moralists who maintain that morality is entirely cut off  from matters aesthetic, which concern the heart, 
and to be arbitrated and cultivated on rational soil alone.  This cannot hold because, under the moral 
beauty view, if  we are to fully fathom morality, we need to be sensitive to beauty too. Rationality is 
required, but unless affect concurs, matters remain unsettled. 
 In sum, the view I espouse suggests that unless moralists take aesthetics seriously and 
aestheticists take morality seriously, that is, unless both aesthetics and ethics are understood and 
pursued in tandem, our respective grasp of  them will remain partial and compromised. This much is 
logically implied by the moral beauty view. Presumably, however, these considerations apply mutatis 
mutandis to aesthetics and ethics both as appreciative and as practical domains. Here, as already 
suggested, I will focus on the latter, and on some of  the promises that the notion of  moral beauty and 
ugliness holds for practice, specifically education, broadly construed. So, let me begin by suggesting two 
ways in which moral beauty (and ugliness) can be manifested in the public sphere, and then proceed to 
mention how I think that the notions of  moral beauty and ugliness can, in fact, contribute to practice. 
III. Examples of  Moral Beauty and Ugliness 
Moral beauty is a feature of  people’s gestures, characters, and so of  people themselves. Indeed, one way 
for which we may argue for the moral beauty view is by appeal to ordinary experience. It is a common 
enough experience that we sometimes meet people whom we find far from attractive––indeed, we may 
find them ugly––and whom we come to find beautiful, on continued experience. Conversely, we may 
come, upon continued experience, to find someone ugly whom we previously found beautiful. More 
often than not, such experiential shifts are explained by appeal to the fact that we become acquainted 
with their characters, we find them kind, honest, or fair, and that it is these qualities that explain our 
finding them beautiful. There is empirical evidence that such changes in our aesthetic responses to one 
another occur frequently, and that, when we are conscious of  them, we do, in fact, appeal to moral 
qualities in explaining our aesthetic appreciation (Paris 2018a).  
 Thought experiments also point in the direction of  the moral beauty view. A case in point is 
Nehamas’ discussion of  David Lynch’s film The Elephant Man, which is a film about Joseph Merrick, a 
grossly deformed man in 19th century London who, in the beginning of  the film, strikes us as not only 
very ugly, but positively shocking. However, as the film progresses, and we come to experience Merrick 
as a kind, loving, and honest, an individual with unbending faith despite all his misfortunes, we not only 
become used to his appearance, but his presence comes to be experienced with a pleasure recognisably 
like that which we take in contemplating other beautiful objects.  The philosopher Stephen Davies 8
recently invited us to engage in a thought experiment designed to make a similar, albeit converse, point:  
Picture an outwardly beautiful woman who when she speaks, reveals that she is embittered, 
nasty, and vicious. Not only does she become less desirable, she comes to look less beautiful. Or, 
to get further away from appearances, a better way to make the point is to say that the interest 
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in her beauty, which unreflectively seemed to be confined to her physical attributes, is revealed 
by the negative response as having a wider scope all along. It carried assumptions about how 
she would perform as a person more broadly. When those assumptions are challenged by her 
behavior, she is revealed as less beautiful than was supposed. (2012, p. 112) 
I think that the notions of  moral beauty and ugliness, as articulated in the first section, offer the best 
explanation of  the aforementioned phenomena, as well as intuitions in response to these thought 
experiments, but since I have argued for this claim in some detail elsewhere ([author] 2018), I will not 
elaborate on it here. I will only say that the foregoing considerations, if  anything, make the moral 
beauty view highly plausible and therefore worth our while. They also suggest that people are often 
experienced as beautiful or ugly in virtue of  their character traits or personalities. 
 Now, although moral beauty (and ugliness) is centrally a feature of  people, and more abstractly, 
people’s characters, like much beauty (and ugliness), I think that it can also be found in artworks, 
including works of  music, buildings like churches and houses, or sculptures. This is because artworks 
too can manifest certain personality traits; these are appreciated through tracing the choices that have 
culminated in the end product. For instance, in the understated gesture of  the 9/11 memorial, one can 
see respectfulness towards the individual and the community, a sense of  togetherness and friendship in 
the face of  disaster, and a firm conviction that this is what is taken out of  the world in acts like the 
9/11 terror attacks, and what we should reaffirm in response; this seems like the morally apt approach 
to the matter at stake, and it is where the beauty of  the 9/11 memorial lies.  
 Indeed, artists have long exploited our experience of  moral beauty, as evinced in the 
experiential shifts appealed to above, and to profound effects. When literary characters are presented as 
physically ugly but then revealed to be of  great moral virtue, our experience faithfully presents them to 
us as beautiful in contemplation, as witness the effect of  Plato’s descriptions of  Socrates, Quasimodo in 
The Hunchback of  Notre-Dame, or the Creature in Frankenstein. The converse likewise holds for physically 
beautiful people who prove to be morally vicious over the course of  a narrative. Our disgust in 
characters such as Dorian Gray, Humbert Humbert in Lolita, and Vronsky in Anna Karenina, clearly 
supports the claim that these characters come to be experienced as ugly in virtue of  their vices.  
 Here are some more examples, drawn from my own experience.  In Bach’s Erbarme dich, mein 9
Gott, sincere compassion and sympathy can be heard to pervade the aria as a whole, not just the lyrics, 
and in Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony one struggles to suppress an image of  joyful and loving abandon 
wherein, our common humanity recognised, people are united through respect as in Kant’s ideal of  a 
kingdom of  ends. Similarly, Anna Karenina is shot through with a sense of  sympathy for Anna that 
Tolstoy (or Tolstoy as he appears in that novel) manifests on every page, and which is at least part of  
what makes this work so beautiful. There is a similar beauty in individual characters in many novels and 
plays. For instance, there is beauty in Antigone, manifest in her apt response to the choice put to her by 
Creon, when she recognises it as a genuine dilemma and confronts it at face value, in the context of  a 
work which highlights the limits and limitations of  the human condition. And there is great beauty, too, 
in Father Zosima’s quiet humility in The Brothers Karamazov, as well as Sonya’s sacrifice to support a poor 
and reckless family out of  mercy and kindness, which Dostoevsky makes manifest through every 
sentence used to convey her personality in Crime and Punishment. It is, I think, highly plausible that the 
undeniable beauty of  such works is inseparable from––in other words, cannot be explained without 
appealing to–– the moral virtues that they evince. Strip any of  these works of  their moral qualities, and 
their beauty is sure to diminish––reverse these qualities, and the works will become ugly. Below, I will 
offer some more detailed examples of  morally beautiful artworks, but for now I hope that these 
examples will suffice to illustrate what I have in mind in speaking of  such moral beauty. 
 So what is the point of  advancing such cases and pointing out the moral beauty in them, 
supposing, as aforementioned, that this is a genuine species of  beauty and that these are plausible 
instances of  it? I think that appreciation for moral beauty and ugliness can be built into a programme 
of  character education and that, even outside of  such a programme, if  it is possible to cultivate a 
recognition of, or sensitivity to, moral beauty, it can, presumably, do at least some of  the work on its 
own. This can be accomplished by ensuring that moral beauty features prominently in the public 
domain. In other words, my suggestion is that familiarity with the notion of  moral beauty and ugliness, 
and its presence in one’s conceptual framework, will enable one to see moral virtues and vices in 
aesthetic terms; and that this, provided that instances of  moral beauty assume a prominent position in 
the public sphere, can both supplement and complement character education, while also contributing 
to the maintenance of  virtue in society. This is basically a direct consequence of  what seem to be plain 
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facts about beauty. Consider some near-platitudinous claims about beauty: beauty grounds attraction; 
the beautiful is the object of  love; beauty prompts copies of  itself; the beautiful is said to be valued for 
its own sake, not merely for the pleasure that it evokes. Conversely, we shun the ugly, avoid it, and 
would do much to rid it of  ourselves and our surroundings. If  beauty and ugliness have the qualities 
just mentioned, and if  virtue is (experienced as) beautiful and vice (as) ugly, then, as our intellectual 
predecessors thought, it is plausible that beauty and ugliness may pave a solid route towards moral 
virtue, and one that also taps into the right affective dimensions. 
IV. Beauty and Moral Education 
Character education, specifically moral character education, and indeed one with Aristotelian 
sympathies, such as that espoused by the working framework of  the Jubilee Centre for Character and 
Virtues, and articulated in greater detail in Kristjánsson’s work (e.g. 2015), recognises a number of  ways 
in which character can be acquired: it can be taught, caught, and sought. Now, the acquisition of  
character through at least more or less traditional teaching will, I suspect, only or mostly contribute to 
the acquisition of  what the Jubilee Centre and Kristjánsson call ‘virtue literacy’, i.e., a familiarity with, 
and ability to skilfully wield, virtue-theoretical terminology. Indeed, this is what interventions to date 
have been successful at achieving (ibid., p. 158).  
 In addition to being taught, character can also be caught and sought. These refer, respectively, 
to the acquisition of  character through one’s surroundings (for instance, a school’s ethos, or the degree 
of  emotional stability in one’s family), and one’s own initiative in seeking out one’s own character 
improvement. But things like a school’s ethos on its own seems a rather weak ground for acquiring 
virtue, unless it is either imposed on students (e.g., through uniforms, particular etiquette, etc.); or it 
becomes routine, and so habituated; or it is exemplary: students are attracted to it. While, unfortunately, 
despite its being well-known that family stability and the like are important for proper psychological 
development, these can neither be guaranteed, nor are they always sufficient for virtue. When it comes 
to seeking virtue, it is (barring psychological extremes of  self-imposition, etc.) only one’s conviction 
that virtue is worth the effort of  acquiring it––which is just another way of  speaking of  one’s attraction 
to virtue––that can lead to its pursuit. 
 So let us consider how the notions of  moral beauty and ugliness may feature in different realms 
of  virtue acquisition and cultivation. While the considerations below, although offered as independent 
of, and additional to, character building through teaching, do, I think, point to ways in which moral 
beauty can be built into educational programmes. To begin with, it is worth pointing out that mere 
virtue literacy, even coupled with a sense of  duty, or even with components of  phronesis comprising 
reasoning and skills that enable fine conceptual discriminations, are a far cry from the sort of  ideal of  
Aristotelian virtue, mentioned earlier whereby the virtuous individual—starting from imitation of  
behaviour and internalisation of  such behaviour, and perhaps principles—does the good because it is 
good—or for the sake of  the ‘kalon’, whilst (as the latter term suggests) taking pleasure in doing so.  
 Many past thinkers have been tempted by the thought that an education in beauty can 
contribute to moral development.  Of  course, many today would consider such views plain wishful 10
thinking. But this may be because we, as a society and an intellectual status quo, have forgotten about 
moral beauty. Although things are probably not that simple, by ignoring the aesthetic component of  
moral virtues and vices, anything of  substance in views like the aforementioned will be lost. Surely 
beauty in general hardly makes us better people, as the cases of  tasteful Nazis, Wagner, etc., make clear. 
Still, beauty, and recognition thereof, is often said to prompt attraction, desire, love, emulation, and the 
like. If  the connection between beauty and desire, attraction, love, a tendency to emulate the beautiful 
object, etc., are facts about normal human psychology (or even traits that we can inculcate in ourselves 
and others); if, moreover, we can highlight and educate people in discerning not only beauty in general, 
but moral beauty in particular; then perhaps a road to virtue, via beauty, opens up. 
 Consider firstly the question of  moral motivation, which is more relevant to the notion of  
character being caught. There is a debate in philosophy over the question of  whether or not moral 
judgements are as such motivating. The moral beauty view suggests that this question may be 
somewhat ill-posed, for fully possessing moral virtue entails sensitivity to beauty, beauty includes the 
beauty of  virtues, and hence a fully-fledged first-person moral judgement is also aesthetic, and it is a 
conceptual and empirical platitude that beauty arouses conative states in its appreciators. So, first, 
leaving beauty out of  these debates is a mistake, and, second, it is possible that it is neither goodness 
nor rightness understood as isolated properties that ground moral motivation, but beauty instead, i.e., 
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their aesthetic component. If  so, then at least part of  the explanation for why moral virtue is desirable 
or attractive is straightforward: it is beautiful, hence pleasurable. 
 It is important to be clear here. The pleasure in question is taken in observing or contemplating 
moral virtue, not necessarily in performing morally virtuous deeds. For virtuous acts that demand great 
courage or even self-sacrifice need not (and are unlikely to) please the agent performing them. 
However, they do please those observing or contemplating them. Motivation through moral beauty, 
then, should be understood as grounded in pleasure and displeasure stemming from experiencing 
examples of  moral virtue and vice and wanting to emulate the former, whilst avoiding the latter. We 
hear about virtuous people, we may meet some of  them if  we are fortunate, and we also have accounts 
of  such persons as Jesus Christ, Socrates, and so on. The pleasure we take in them makes us want to be 
like them. Elaine Scarry suggests that ‘[b]eauty brings copies of  itself  into being’ (1999, p. 3) because in 
finding something beautiful we are motivated to introduce more of  it into the world. Conversely, Saito 
thinks that ‘we often work, or believe we should work, toward improving the aesthetics of  everyday 
environment and life. Negative aesthetic experiences are thus useful and necessary in detecting what is 
harmful to the quality of  life and environment and provide an impetus for improvement’ (2015). Thus, 
our desire to eliminate the ugly, coupled with a sensitivity to moral ugliness, may deter us from moral 
vice, even if  we are not sufficiently motivated to pursue moral virtue. If  philosophers since Plato are 
right in thinking that beauty is not only desirable but also awakens emotions that are motivating for 
those who can appreciate it, including love, or a desire to emulate the beautiful object, to understand it, 
and so on (see Nehamas, 2007), then the fact that morality is said to motivate its own pursuit should 
hardly perplex us. If  those whose aesthetics are in order, ceteris paribus, desire the beautiful and shun the 
ugly, then through the notions of  moral beauty and ugliness we may glean a psychologically plausible 
and theoretically parsimonious story about moral motivation. The point is not that moral motivation is 
either guaranteed or easily premised on moral beauty and ugliness. But that a general attraction to 
beauty, coupled with an ability to discern moral beauty and ugliness, may offer a pathway to virtue, 
albeit no doubt beset with obstacles. The first step in this direction, I suggest, is to rekindle, in people’s 
conceptual (and consequently affective) repertoires, the connection between moral virtue and beauty, 
moral ugliness and vice. Once this is firmly established in people’s minds, much, I expect, will follow.  
 One of  the implications of  the above is that the presence of  moral beauty in the public sphere 
will increase the likelihood that a taste for it, and so for virtue, will be acquired by the public. Earlier I 
spoke about the moral beauty of  people, specifically people who are well-known especially through 
features or accomplishments other than their virtuous behaviour or character. Such people include 
politicians, actors, musicians, dancers, and comedians, among others. And I think that when such 
people are virtuous, and hence morally beautiful, and where audiences are well-placed enough to 
recognise such moral beauty, the moral beauty of  these public figures may play an important role in 
instilling virtue in the public. My point here is not just the fairly obvious one, given the foregoing, 
namely that it’s good to have exemplars around, whose virtue is an example to us all. This is only one 
way virtues may be magnetic through the presence of  moral beauty in the public domain. I also wish to 
suggest that people who are already admired—in some cases, for better or worse, nearly worshipped—
including pop stars, actors, and so on, can substantially contribute to promoting virtue through their 
popularity. This is a more risky thought, but the idea is this: there is evidence that we copy people that 
we find to possess status (e.g. Henrich, 2016). Now, this imitative impulse is not too selective (from an 
evolutionary standpoint, this probably serves to ensure accuracy and that one does not miss the salient 
features through some blindspot or other); that is, we tend to copy others in more respects than the 
ones for which we admire them or look up to them; so, people will copy the clothes and shower gel 
used by their favourite football player and drive pop stars’ cars (television commercials are sufficient 
proof  of  this); this tendency can be so pronounced as to lead to maladaptive behaviours: there is 
evidence that the suicides of  certain celebrities prompt waves of  suicides that are best explained by 
appeal to mimetic behaviours, as opposed to mental health problems and the like (ibid., pp. 49-50).  
 If  features and behaviours as peripheral as hair colour or as extreme as suicide are imitated, 
then it would seem safe to predict that virtue, provided that it features prominently enough in a popular 
figure’s profile, and is displayed consistently, will also be imitated; indeed, virtue is beautiful and a more 
central aspect of  its possessor’s personality, so that the motivation to imitate it should be greater than 
the motivation to imitate other (non-beautiful and peripheral) features of  such people; this makes it 
more likely that virtue will be imitated. 
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 Of  course, in order for all of  this to work, it is important that people actually possess the (true) 
belief  that moral virtue is beautiful and vice ugly, and that they become at least somewhat sensitive to 
these qualities. I think that teaching that will introduce the relevant notions and guide our patterns of  
attention and/or considerable exposure to certain artworks and individuals with moral beauty, can help 
us acquire the relevant beliefs and aesthetic sensitivity. For instance, art seems in a position to afford us 
the (non-trivial) knowledge that moral traits are beautiful and immoral ones ugly. This is because art can 
grant us epistemic access to characters and their individual traits and thereby also their beauty and 
ugliness. Such access can be acquired in a number of  ways: subjects in visual artworks can visually 
express emotions and attitudes; artworks can also display these through the choices of  their manifested 
artists; as can characters in narratives through their dialogues, interior monologues, choices, behaviours, 
etc. By experiencing characters in artworks, such as Iago in Othello or Prince Myshkin in The Idiot, as 
ugly and beautiful, respectively, we can come to believe that the moral virtues are beautiful and their 
contraries ugly.  
 Moreover, art shows us not only that morality is beautiful, immorality ugly, but also allows us to 
experience such beauty and ugliness first-hand, and to become more sensitive to it by pursuing ever more 
subtle and complex renditions thereof, which can vary both in their accessibility and their 
informativeness. Artworks differ in complexity, depth, subtlety, etc., not only in terms of  their 
perceptible configurations, but also in terms of  their moral-characterological explorations (see e.g. 
Carroll, 2002). Perhaps, then, artworks can sharpen our discriminative abilities and refine our taste for 
moral beauty. This, I think, should count as a morally-laden cognitive improvement, and one that 
resembles closely aspects of  the virtue of  phronesis. Allow me to expand on this last thought a little. 
 Dominic Lopes has identified one way whereby visual artworks in particular can cognitively 
improve us, by motivating the acquisition, and enabling the exercise, and subsequent refinement of, 
certain intellectual virtues, such as being a ‘fine observer’ (2006, p. 148). Fine observation, Lopes 
argues, is required for appreciating certain pictures, so that our interaction with them can motivate us to 
acquire and develop it. Moreover, pictures can foster and develop such skills as are constitutive of  fine 
observation. These include ‘delicacy of  discrimination’ (ibid.), viz., the ability to see better, become 
more attentive to detail, etc., which can be acquired by looking hard at pictures and becoming sensitive 
to various features; ‘accuracy in seeing’ (ibid., p. 149), which involves becoming more discerning and 
sensitive to the felt qualities of  visual experiences; and ‘adaptability of  seeing’ (ibid.), which refers to 
artworks’ enabling us to ‘see what is otherwise invisible’ (ibid., p. 150), by granting us access to qualities 
that are unavailable to ordinary visual perception. These benefits are not simply experiential because, to 
the extent that such experiences can be brought under concepts, they can contribute to ‘belief  
formation, knowledge gathering, and reasoning. Pictures have cognitive merit in so far as they bring 
about revisions to the way we conceptualize visual experience’ (ibid.). No wonder then that insofar as 
they have such merits, artworks are praised for being true-to-life, insightful, revealing, profound, etc. 
(ibid., pp. 151-152). 
 I think that this sort of  account can be extended, mutatis mutandis, to the discernment and 
appreciation of  moral beauty. When a work’s subject matter is of  a moral nature, and its exploration 
requires such skills as the aforementioned, because of  the insightful and revelatory way whereby the 
subject matter is handled, the excellence of  fine observation required and fostered by appreciation of  
that work plausibly also requires and fosters finer moral discrimination. To illustrate, consider 
Rembrandt’s painting known as The Jewish Bride.  The couple represented is far from physically 11
attractive; yet there is great beauty in them. To appreciate this beauty, we need to be sensitive to the 
work’s subject matter, namely human love, and to the particular way in which it is handled by 
Rembrandt. Notice, for instance, how the man’s hand, clearly caressing the woman's breast, could have 
made this picture vulgar, had minute features been but slightly altered. The Jewish Bride is, of  course, 
anything but vulgar: the man’s face assures both his bride and the viewer of  his love. This manifests 
Rembrandt’s signature skill, namely his power for capturing and communicating human emotion. The 
husband’s expression is subtle, yet profoundly meaningful, plausibly conveying at once happiness, 
devotion, tenderness, understanding and acceptance of  the troubles ahead, as well as the determination 
to face them; it leaves no doubts as to his motives and intentions. The wife is affirming the bond and 
accepting the proposed protection, care, and love, by gently caressing his hand with hers; and the 
viewer is compelled to recognise the value of, and admire, this union. Against this background, the 
positioning of  the man’s hand on the bride’s breast can be seen to serve a dual purpose. It may remind 
us that what we have here is a love which has an ethical and spiritual dimension, yet does not shy away 
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from its physical manifestation, without suggesting that either can be reduced to the other: a profound 
rendition of  a genuinely human affair. At the same time, the gesture may serve as a comment on how 
love as a virtuous bond can transcend its physical consummation, however much the latter is 
foregrounded. In this way, Rembrandt’s visual treatment of  the subject highlights the value of  virtuous 
love, something further indicated by his handling of  the light; the newlyweds appear radiant, their love 
paling the darker background, which, virtually in monochrome, looks almost unfinished. This painting, 
then, offers us insights into the nature of  a moral emotion, while making us feel, through the features 
just indicated, its value. 
 Arguably, all of  the skills that Lopes discusses are at once required and enhanced in 
appreciating Rembrandt’s work and its moral dimension. Not only must we closely attend to details, but 
we must also become keenly aware of  the experience that these ground, and observe more than is there 
to be seen in the picture, i.e., identify what it reveals and how it reveals it. Furthermore, the subject 
matter being morally salient, these considerations enhance not only our discernment of  pictorial 
features but, since at least some of  these play an ethical role in the picture, our moral discriminative 
abilities also. Moulded through our perusal of  artworks such as Rembrandt’s, moreover, such 
appreciative experiences inform, enrich, and refine our conceptual repertoire. 
 Other artworks can make us better appreciators of  moral beauty and ugliness, by getting us to 
‘see’ more quiet, subtle, or indeed difficult instances thereof. Towards the end of  Haneke’s film Amour 
(2012), for instance, Georges kills his wife Anne who has suffered two strokes in the film’s early stages, 
by suffocating her with a pillow. The film, employing various cinematic techniques, enables the 
attentive, open-minded viewer, to see beyond the mere physical act, into Georges’ motivation, which 
(arguably at least) is wholly grounded in concern for Anne, his life-long spouse, whom he dearly loves. 
Subtle visual cues, gestures, observations by characters, responses, and so on, pave the way for 
perceiving what is an inevitably violent scene, which would otherwise merely look brutal and ugly, as an 
act of  loving concern. There is arguably beauty there, although it may take effort, open-mindedness, 
and patience to appreciate. 
 If  these remarks are plausible, then, artworks such as Amour not only require and enhance the 
aforementioned observational skills, but can also serve as elaborate ethical thought experiments, by 
putting us in a position where we are invited to reflect on certain moral questions, upon careful 
attention to the particularities of  characters and situations. For instance, while many traditional moral 
theories might prescribe absolutely against killing, Amour seems to put such prescriptions to the test 
against a concrete and richly textured example, in which the beauty of  the motivation, manifesting 
loving concern for another, serves as a direct challenge to such absolutism. Thus, in addition to 
sharpening our cognitive and moral appreciative skills, moral cognitive gains from art can resemble 
those we reap from thought experiments in moral philosophy (cf. Gaut 2007, pp. 157-164). 
V. Objections and Replies 
Against my claims it may be objected, first, that beauty is only a matter of  appearance, so the proposals 
here are not only false but potentially misleading.  
 This worry disappears once we notice that the claim that beauty is only a matter of  appearance 
is either false, or rests on a conflation between two senses of  appearance. On the one hand, appearance 
may refer physical or perceptible appearance, in which case this objection would deny that characters 
etc. can be beautiful in the first place. The motivation for such a view is an assumption to the effect 
that beauty and ugliness are predicable only of  perceptible objects. This assumption, however, is 
mistaken, as suggested by the widespread acceptance by experts of  beauty in domains whose objects 
are clearly imperceptible (at least in the sense of  perceptibility that pertains to the five senses), including 
chess moves, theorems in physics, proofs in mathematics, and so on. On the other hand, appearance 
may refer to superficial features of  a thing, as opposed to its deeper structure or ‘true nature’. Thus, a 
car may look good, but be very badly put together, or a flower can be beautiful even though it is made 
of  plastic. But this proposal, again, is problematic, and stems in part from the same misguided 
assumption as the previous one. For consider the case of  mathematical proofs, where the appearance/
reality distinction breaks down: if  someone writes a proof  on paper, the writing may look terrible, but 
we would not say that the proof  is ugly, but only that a written version of  it is ugly. Likewise, in the 
previous cases we can say that insofar as the car or the flower are considered as objects to be looked at, 
or visible things, they may be beautiful, but may not be beautiful in terms of  their structure qua car and 
flower, respectively. But there is another sense of  appearance, where appearance simply refers to direct 
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experience. The claim, under this interpretation, is that beauty is something to be judged on the basis 
of  direct experience. Whether or not this is true is debatable, but what is clear for our purposes is that 
this is no objection to the present proposal, for appearance in this sense includes thought and 
contemplation, when the object in question is abstract, as are character traits, thought, actions, etc. 
Hence, the first objection poses no threat to my proposal. 
 Second, this approach to moral education seems to locate moral motivation in precisely the 
wrong place, i.e., the beauty, rather than the intrinsic worth of, the good. It may thus appear to stem 
from a self-interested or vain desire for beauty.  
 Much here depends on what is meant by ‘self-interested’. On the one hand, self-interestedness 
may refer to a general desire for self-improvement. In this sense, anyone who wants to become a 
morally better person is self-interested. But it would be absurd to call such a person self-interested in 
any sense that is incompatible with being properly morally motivated. The worry only threatens my 
proposal if  self-interestedness is understood as a criticism for someone’s lack of  other-regarding 
concern, or if  their motives for becoming moral are not themselves moral, i.e., their desire for moral 
improvement is only grounded in non-moral considerations. But the desire to become morally beautiful 
stems from an attraction to the moral beauty of  others, their characters and responses, and a desire to 
emulate them out of  admiration, love, etc. To the extent that such responses evoked by moral beauty 
are responsive to moral properties, this kind of  motivation is not incompatible with virtue. So to think 
that motivation grounded in moral beauty is objectionably self-interested evinces a conceptual 
confusion between a sense of  self-interest compatible with, and one incompatible with, morality. 
Someone who wants to become morally beautiful is no more (objectionably) self-interested than 
someone who wants to become a morally better person. 
 Of  course, one may still resist my suggestions on the grounds that morally virtuous motivation 
cannot be grounded in beauty, for whereas virtuous motivation is intrinsic, i.e., requires that one is 
motivated by virtue itself  or by others’ needs, motivation grounded in moral beauty is not. We should 
by now be in a position to see that this objection rests on a misunderstanding. Beauty is a component 
of  virtue. So, the intrinsic motivation proper to virtue seems to require a recognition of, and 
motivational basis in, its beauty, if  virtue is to motivate as a whole. Even if  it were possible to be 
motivated not by virtue itself  but only by its beauty, this kind of  motivation would hardly take one far; 
for someone discerning of  moral beauty would quickly notice that being motivated to emulate the 
beauty of  the morally virtuous cannot succeed if  construed independently of  moral considerations, for 
then one’s motivation will not be appropriate, one will fail to be morally virtuous, and so will be devoid 
of  moral beauty. 
 Finally, this whole project simply dresses up character education in an aesthetic language, while 
in fact contributing little, if  anything, to available resources geared towards character education.  
 This objection fails to observe the dialectic in my paper. The problem is the conspicuous 
absence of  any discussion of  moral beauty and ugliness from debates in both philosophy and, more 
importantly, moral education and psychology. The aesthetic language in question makes salient the 
aesthetic component of  something about which much is already known—though, if  it does have an 
aesthetic component that is neglected, not fully known after all. So the suggestions here do not actually 
amount to a revisionism of  already existing methods or practices, but propose additions to them. 
Beauty cannot replace learning a vocabulary of  virtue terms, understanding relevant distinctions, 
knowing something about the history of  ethics and different moral theories, or acquiring reasoning 
skills and experience. What it can do is inspire an attraction to and love of  virtue, a motivation to 
acquire it, to increase our discriminatory capacities and sensitivity to it, and, partly thereby to activate 
and intensify pleasure in its pursuit. These are not the same thing under different description, though 
they are complementary. However, whether or not my speculations on ways in which the focus on 
beauty and ugliness can contribute to character education are, in fact, plausible, can only be judged in 
practice. Indeed, it is precisely as an invitation to colleagues in empirical and practical disciplines to 
consider and test the validity of  its claims, that this article was conceived. 
VI. Some Suggestions for Further Investigations 
While I do not wish to venture beyond the scope of  my expertise, as promised, before concluding, I 
should like to propose three lines of  investigation that are open to researchers and educators who may 
wish to pursue agendas inspired by the foregoing reflections on the theory of  moral beauty. 
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 A first avenue would be exploratory. The notion of  moral beauty is mentioned in work in 
positive psychology and is often understood as the object of  the emotion of  elevation, which is distinct 
from admiration, and which motivates those who experience it to help others (Algoe and Haidt 2009). I 
think that it would be worthwhile to further refine the notion of  moral beauty, enquiring into how 
much work ‘beauty’ is doing in the positive-psychological notion, by comparing experiences of  moral 
beauty and elevation, with those of  different kinds of  beauty. For if, for instance, that notion proves to 
be less aesthetically charged than the philosophical one that I have been discussing (something that is 
not unlikely), then it would need to be replaced by a novel construct and new instruments would have 
to be designed to measure it. 
 More directly, I think that it would be interesting to design an instrument (not unlike, for 
instance, Diessner et al. 2008) in order to see whether there are people who consciously find virtue 
beautiful and vice ugly, and examine their experiences qualitatively.  
 A second line of  investigation could focus on testing hypotheses such as that thinking of  virtue 
in aesthetic terms, and acknowledging an aesthetic dimension to virtue, attracts one more to virtuous 
people and behaviours; in short, thinking in this way is more motivating than seeing virtue or morality 
simply under the guise of  the right or the good. One simple suggestion along this proposal would be to 
examine whether claiming to find virtue beautiful (see, e.g., Diessner et al. 2008), who investigated how 
many people experience moral beauty) predicts better scores on virtue questionnaires. Even better, their 
behaviour may be tracked and their motivations studied in longitudinal studies, which can use, for 
instance, experience-sampling methods. 
 Finally, a third proposed line of  practice involves interventions. Educators could use stories, 
films, or songs that manifest virtues, as was done by the Jubilee Centre’s Knightly Virtues project, which 
used stories to develop children’s sensitivity to virtue concepts (Arthur et al. 2014), but discuss them in 
aesthetic terms, speaking of  the beauty or the moral beauty of  the courageous and honest, characters, 
kindling the thought that perhaps beauty is not just skin-deep, and instilling into pupils the idea that 
there is a beauty that is not physical, but is all the more attractive for that. This pedagogical intervention 
could then be followed by questionnaires or interviews that would seek to gauge its effects on 
dimensions like virtue literacy, motivation, and behaviour, even longitudinally. 
 While I the foregoing are the suggestions of  a layperson, I do not think that they are any less 
interesting or promising for that; indeed, they certainly seem worth researchers’ while; for if  they yield 
positive results, then the benefits to be gleaned should be obvious; while, if  they do not, then at least 
we can lay to rest a theory that has preoccupied philosophers, theologians, educators, and artists since 
time immemorial––but which has largely been ignored in our own times––knowing that we have tried 
to use it but failed. 
  
VII. Conclusion 
I begun by introducing a view whereby the moral virtues are beautiful and the moral vices ugly, 
subsequently illustrating it with examples of  beauty that I think stem from the moral qualities of  both 
people and objects like artworks. I then proceeded to offer some proposals for how a rekindling of  
these notions in our conceptual repertoire, and a reflection on, and sensitivity to, moral beauty and 
ugliness, may contribute to the cultivation of  virtue in different ways by inspiring emulation, firmly 
anchoring moral motivation, and even going some way towards offering a pathway to virtue 
independently of, as well as complementary to, formal practices of  moral education. I ended by 
rebutting three objections to my proposal, to conclude that it has considerable merit, and should be 
taken seriously by those with a flair for empirical research, as well as those with a role in character 
education.  12
––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Word count: 8,473 (including notes, excluding abstract); 8,650 (including abstract). 
––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
References 
[Please note: three references have been removed for anonymity.] 
Aristotle. (2002). Nicomachean Ethics. (S. Broadie and C. Rowe, Eds.; C. Rowe, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
!10
Arthur, J. et al. (2014). Knightly Virtues: Enhancing Virtue Literacy Through Stories – Research Report. 
Birmingham: The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues, University of  Birmingham. 
Carroll, N. (2002). The Wheel of  Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge. Journal of  Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism, 60(1), 3-26. 
Davies, S. (2012). The Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Diessner, R. et al. (2008). Engagement with Beauty: Appreciating Natural, Artistic, and Moral Beauty. 
The Journal of  Psychology: Interdisciplinary and Applied, 142(3), 303-332. 
Eco, U. (1986). Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Hume, D. (1975). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of  Morals. (L.A. 
Selby-Bigge, Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hutcheson, F. (2004). An Inquiry Into the Original of  Our Ideas of  beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises. (W. 
Leidhold, Ed.). Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 
Gaut, B. (2007). Art, Emotion and Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Henrich, J. (2016). The Secret of  Our Success. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Hickey, D. (2012). The Invisible Dragon: Essays on Beauty. Chicago, IL: University of  Chicago Press. 
Jaeger, C.S. (2012). Enchantment: On Charisma and the Sublime in the Arts of  the West. Philadelphia, PA: 
University of  Pennsylvania Press.  
Kristjánsson, K. (2015). Aristotelian Character Education. Oxon: Routledge. 
Lopes, D.M. (2006). Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McGinn, C. (1997). Ethics, Evil, and Fiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mothersill, M. (1984). Beauty Restored. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nehamas, A. (2007). Only a Promise of  Happiness. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Norton, R.E. (1995). The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press. 
Paris, P. (2017). The Deformity-Related Conception of  Ugliness. British Journal of  Aesthetics, 57(2), 
139-160.  
Paris, P. (2018a). The Empirical Case for Moral Beauty. Australasian Journal of  Philosophy, 96(4), 642-656. 
Paris, P. (2018b). On Form, and the Possibility of  Moral Beauty. Metaphilosophy, 49(5), 711-729. 
Saito, Y. (2015). Aesthetics of  the Everyday. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, 
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-of-everyday/>. 
Sartwell, C. (2006). Six Names of  Beauty. New York: Routledge. 
Scarry, E. (1999). On Beauty and Being Just. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Schiller, F. (2016). On the Aesthetic Education of  Man. (K. Tribe, Trans.). London: Penguin. 
Scruton, R. (2009). Beauty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shaftesbury, A.A.C. Third Earl of. (2001). Characteristics of  Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Fund. 




 For a sample of  these debates, see the articles in Classical Philology, 104(4), October 2010, dedicated to “Beauty, 1
Harmony, and the Good”. 
 See, for instance, Eco (1986), for a useful discussion.2
 For a history of  the moral beauty view, with a focus on its development in Germany, France, and Britain, in the 3
Enlightenment, see Norton (1995).
 This way of  formulating the view is due to Gaut (2007, p. 120). It is worth mentioning that although my focus 4
here is beauty, I think that other aesthetic properties, including the sublime, elegant, or funny, can also be 
attributed to character traits. Moreover, I think that non-moral character traits, including the intellectual or 
performance virtues, may also have aesthetic qualities. While I refrain from discussing these matters here would 
take me beyond the purview of  this paper, I think that doing so would be a very worthwhile enterprise.
 An obvious worry here is that there are some ugly people who are morally virtuous. But it is important here to 5
clarify that I understand aesthetic evaluations in terms of  beauty and ugliness to proceed in a pro tanto fashion. In 
other words, when we say that this or that thing is beautiful or ugly overall, our judgement comprises a number 
of  more specific judgements, each of  which may be qualified by an ‘insofar as’ clause, or by speaking of  different 
respects in which something is beautiful or ugly. For instance, you may think that Les demoiselles d’Avignon is ugly 
insofar as its representational content goes, i.e., that the figures in it are ugly, but beautiful in terms of  its 
composition. Or you may think that a novel by Charles Dickens is ugly in virtue of  its sentimentality, but 
beautiful in terms of  its story or language use. So in saying that X is ugly, we are not necessarily saying that X is 
ugly in every respect, but that it is ugly overall, i.e., all things considered. Thus, there is no problem in saying that 
someone who is ugly in respect of  their physical appearance is also beautiful in respect of  their character.
 The qualifications and views in this paragraph are developed and defended in Gaut (2007). Similar points are 6
made in McGinn (1997), but there are problems with his view that Gaut (2007) addresses. The most recent work 
on the moral beauty view is by myself  (Paris 2018a, 2018b).
 For other recent defences of  the view that appeal to thought experiments and intuitions, see McGinn (1997) 7
and Gaut (2007). While their views are slightly different, these differences do not bear on any of  the issues 
discussed in this paper and so shall be set aside.
 See Nehamas (2007, p. 59).8
 If  the reader disagrees with these examples, I encourage her to delve into her own experience with artworks 9
and consider whether or not there are any that support my case.
 This is true of  Shaftesbury (2001), and is implied in Hume (1975) and Hutcheson (2004), as well as being a 10
staple of  Schiller’s philosophy; see, for instance, Schiller (2016).
 While the subject of  this painting is not known, and the title derives from an interpretation of  the painting 11
which is no longer thought to be valid, it seems fairly clear that it deals with human love. Since it is this that 
concerns me here, I shall refrain from getting bogged down in interpretative debates.
 I am grateful to Kristján Kristjánsson for feedback on an earlier version of  this article and to Berys Gaut and 12
Sarah Broadie for helpful comments on earlier versions of  parts of  this article. I am also grateful to three 
anonymous referees for the JME for very helpful comments that have improved this paper. A version of  this 
article was presented at the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues’ 2018 Annual Conference at Oriel College, 
Oxford; I would like to thank the audience there for helpful comments.
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